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Firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activity has become the subject of a large literature in 
recent years. This paper analyzes CSR activity using quasi-experimental variation created by Section 135 
of India’s Companies Act of 2013, which requires (on a “comply-or-explain” basis) that firms satisfying 
specific size or profit thresholds spend a minimum of 2% of their net profit on CSR. We examine effects 
along a number of different dimensions including firm value, CSR spending, and other outcomes, as well 
as exploring broader theoretical implications. Our analysis uses financial statement and stock price data 
on Indian firms from the Prowess database, along with hand-collected data from firms’ disclosures of 
CSR activity. By combining a regression discontinuity (RD) framework (based on a nonparametric local 
polynomial regression approach) with a standard event study, we find a negative and substantial effect on 
the value of affected firms (relative to unaffected firms) around the crucial event date. This effect seems 
to be concentrated among firms that are less customer-facing, as indicated by low advertising 
expenditures. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find significant increases in CSR activity 
among firms affected by Section 135, especially in the fraction of firms engaging in CSR spending. The 
fraction of firms subject to Section 135 that engage in advertising expenditures appears to have declined, 
consistent with substitution between advertising and CSR. There is no robust evidence of any significant 
impact on sales or accounting performance, although a modest decline in the return on assets cannot be 
ruled out. For a subset of large firms, we hand-collect comprehensive CSR data and find that while firms 
initially spending less than 2% increased their CSR activity, large firms initially spending more than 2% 
reduced their CSR expenditures after Section 135 came into effect. We explore various explanations for 
this presumably unintended consequence of Section 135, and also seek to derive some wider implications 
of this analysis for understanding the role of CSR. 
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A vast literature on firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activity has emerged in 
recent years across a number of scholarly disciplines, including law, economics, management, 
accounting, and finance.1 Indeed, understanding the determinants and consequences of firms’ 
CSR activity illuminates various important issues surrounding firm behavior and corporate 
governance, as well as much broader questions about the private provision of public goods and 
the role of corporations in society. For example, one longstanding concern is whether CSR 
activity reflects agency problems – i.e. represents the extraction of private benefits by insiders – 
or instead enhances shareholder value.2 
This paper analyzes the impact of exogenously mandated CSR requirements on firm 
value, on CSR activity, and on various other outcomes such as advertising expenditures, sales 
revenue, and accounting performance. It uses quasi-experimental variation created by Section 
135 of India’s Companies Act of 2013, which requires (on a “comply-or-explain” basis) that 
firms satisfying specific size or profit thresholds undertake CSR activity.3 A large prior literature 
has examined the consequences of CSR spending on share prices, operating performance, 
ownership structure, and other outcomes.4 However, in most studies the variation in CSR 
expenditures is endogenously determined by the firm (e.g. Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012). To 
the best of our knowledge, India’s 2013 Companies Act provides the only example to date of a 
                                                 
1 Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) provide a survey of this extensive literature. CSR is typically defined to include 
various forms of charitable activity and the reduction of negative firm externalities to a greater extent than required 
by law. 
2 Recently, Cheng, Hong and Shue (2014) argue that exogenous improvements in governance lead to reduced 
growth in CSR spending. They use the 2003 tax reform in the US (that reduced tax rates on dividends) as source of 
variation in insider ownership. They also find that close shareholder votes (just above 50%) for measures that 
improve governance lead to slower CSR growth. On the other hand, Ferrell, Liang and Renneboog (2016) use a 
dataset of firms across a large number of countries and find that better governance is associated with higher CSR 
expenditures, suggesting that CSR is not primarily attributable to agency problems, but rather to efforts to increase 
firm value. They analyze the impact of proxies for agency problems on the level of CSR spending by firms. While 
some of these proxies – such as managerial compensation structure – are determined by the firm simultaneously 
with its choice of CSR, others – such as investor protection laws at the country level - are plausibly exogenous to the 
firm. 
3 See the summary of Section 135 by the accounting firm Grant Thornton, available at: 
http://gtw3.grantthornton.in/assets/Companies_Act-CSR.pdf 
4 For instance, Dimson, Karakas and Li (2015) analyze a sample of CSR-related engagements by a large institutional 
investor with US firms. They find that firms where the engagement was successful experience improved accounting 
performance and governance outcomes, relative to firms where the engagement was unsuccessful. 
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legislative mandate to engage in CSR activity, and its thresholds for applicability provide an 
extremely rare instance of quasi-experimental variation in CSR expenditures.5 
Section 135 requires (on a “comply-or-explain” basis) that firms satisfying certain size or 
profit thresholds spend at least 2% of the average of their (pretax domestic) profit over the last 3 
years, if any, on CSR activity. The law also requires that firms above the threshold establish a 
CSR Committee of the Board of Directors. This committee is responsible for formulating the 
firm’s CSR policy, for ensuring that at least 2% of profits are spent on CSR activity, and (where 
applicable) for explaining why the firm failed to achieve the target. Schedule VII of the 2013 
Companies Act provides an illustrative (but apparently not exhaustive) list of activities 
qualifying for CSR status for purposes of the mandate, as discussed in Section 2 below. 
The threshold for the application of Section 135 is multi-faceted, based on turnover (i.e. 
sales revenue), net profits and the concept of “net worth” (the face value of shares originally 
issued by the corporation, adjusted for subsequent retained earnings and various reserves). The 
net worth threshold is set at Indian Rupees (INR) 5 billion (or INR 500 crores6), the sales 
threshold at INR 10 billion, and the net profit threshold at INR 50 million, with any firm 
satisfying at least one of these criteria being subject to the CSR requirement. Importantly, these 
particular thresholds apply only to Section 135, and were not associated with any other 
requirements in Indian company law. The net worth and sales thresholds are set at a level that 
applies to around a quarter of Indian firms, while the net profit threshold is set around the profits 
of the median firm. Because it is typically the net profit threshold that is binding, we focus on 
this threshold in our primary empirical tests. 
The Companies Act of 2013 was enacted on 29 August 2013, and came into effect for the 
2015 fiscal year (i.e. the fiscal year ending on March 31, 2015). The key event dates that marked 
its passage through Parliament are summarized in Table 1. The bill underwent extensive 
discussion and debate over a number of years prior to final enactment. The notion that firms 
would be encouraged to voluntarily undertake CSR was first mooted in late 2009. The first 
announcement of a mandatory CSR requirement for firms above the thresholds noted above was 
                                                 
5 Flammer (2015) finds a positive effect of CSR activity on financial performance, comparing the effects of CSR-
related shareholder proposals that pass by a narrow majority to those of proposals that narrowly fail. However, CSR 
proposals that are initiated by shareholders may arguably be systematically different in their value effects from CSR 
that is mandated by company law or that is chosen by firm insiders. 
6 In India a crore refers to 10 million INR; thus, for instance, 500 crores is identical to 5 billion INR (roughly 
US$77 million or £55 million at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 65 INR). 
3
Dharmapala and Khanna:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
3 
 
made on August 6, 2010. Subsequent media reports (on December 24, 2010 and various later 
dates) suggested that this measure would be weakened to a “comply-or-explain” obligation. A 
“comply-or-explain” CSR obligation was included as part of the Companies Bill in July 2011. 
The bill was passed by the lower house of Parliament on 18 December 2012 and by the upper 
house on 8 August 2013 (receiving the President’s assent on 29 August 2013).  
We present a simple theoretical model of CSR activity by a firm with a controlling 
shareholder, and characterize the impact of a legal provision mandating a minimum level of CSR 
spending. Our empirical tests are guided by the model, and address the impact of Section 135 on 
firm value, CSR activity, and outcomes such as advertising, sales, and accounting performance. 
To address the effect on firm value, we combine a standard event study methodology with a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design based on the INR 50 million net profit threshold. We first 
compute abnormal stock market returns around the relevant event dates, using stock price data 
from the Prowess database.7 We then compare abnormal returns for firms just above the net 
profit threshold with those for firms just below the threshold. As is standard in the current 
literature, we use a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach in implementing our RD 
framework (e.g. Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 
2014a). 
On the first event date (August 6, 2010, when a CSR mandate was announced), we find a 
substantial negative effect on the value of firms that became subject to the CSR requirement 
(which at that time was expected to be mandatory, rather than a “comply-or-explain” regulation). 
The estimated decline in firm value is about 2.6% to 3.3%, depending on the specification. This 
exceeds the CSR requirement of 2%, possibly reflecting the compliance and disclosure costs of 
establishing a CSR committee and program. The effect seems to be concentrated among firms 
that are less customer-facing, as indicated by low advertising expenditures. The RD estimates for 
all subsequent event dates are statistically insignificant and generally small in magnitude. 
Overall, these results suggest that Section 135 reduced the value of firms by a magnitude 
comparable to (or even larger than) the amount of CSR spending that the provision required. The 
                                                 
7 The Prowess database, maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), reports financial 
statements, share prices, and other relevant data for publicly traded Indian corporations). For more details on the 
Prowess database and for background on Indian corporate law and governance, see e.g. Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013). 
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size of the effect suggests that private returns to CSR activity are quite small for firms around the 
threshold. 
In the accounting literature, an event study by Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) makes an 
important contribution to understanding the effects of Section 135 on firm value. There are a 
number of significant differences between their study and ours that are detailed in Section 4 
below; most importantly, they do not use a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach 
to analyze effects on firm value, and they limit their analysis solely to firm value whereas we 
engage in a more comprehensive study of the impact of this law on a wide range of outcomes, 
including CSR expenditures. Despite these differences, their basic results on firm value are quite 
similar to ours. 
Most firms were not required to disclose CSR spending or activity until Section 135 took 
effect in fiscal year 2015. In light of this, we adopt two strategies to gather data on CSR activity. 
First, from 2012 onwards we can construct proxies for CSR expenditures from Prowess data, but 
the disclosure of these items was voluntary and thus subject to concerns about self-selection. 
Treating missing CSR observations as zeroes, we implement a difference-in-difference approach 
using panel data from Prowess over 2012-2015. The results indicate a substantial increase in 
CSR activity among firms subject to Section 135. This is particularly marked along the extensive 
margin (i.e. in the fraction of firms engaging in positive amounts of CSR spending). We also 
examine the impact of Section 135 on various other firm-level outcomes. There is some evidence 
of a decline in the fraction of firms subject to Section 135 engaging in advertising, which is 
consistent with some degree of substitution between advertising and CSR spending. There is no 
robust evidence of any significant impact on sales, perhaps reflecting optimization by firms 
along this dimension prior to the reform. Some of the compliance and disclosure costs of Section 
135 would imply declines in accounting performance. However, there is no statistically 
significant impact on firms’ return on assets (ROA) that is detectable, although a modest decline 
in ROA cannot be ruled out. 
Second, for a subsample consisting of the largest 100 firms, the self-selection issue noted 
earlier can be overcome because India’s securities regulator – the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) – required these firms to disclose their CSR spending in the year prior to the 
Companies Act 2013 taking effect. Although the sample size is quite small (just the top 100 
firms), it is apparent that firms initially spending less than 2% of their profits on CSR increased 
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their CSR activity, while those that were initially spending more than 2% reduced their CSR 
expenditures towards 2% after Section 135 came into effect. On balance, however, the former 
effect was larger than the latter, so that aggregate CSR spending increased in this sample. 
Additional tests suggest that the latter effect does not seem attributable to mean reversion in CSR 
spending. We explore various explanations for this presumably unintended consequence of 
Section 135. 
The paper also seeks to elucidate some of the wider implications of this policy for 
understanding the role of CSR. CSR mandates seem analogous to taxes but are also different in 
important respects. We explore the conditions under which CSR mandates on firms may be 
optimal responses by a (relatively benevolent) government to concerns with the provision of 
these activities by the government (e.g., governance failures, weak information on the part of the 
government on effective providers of CSR services, or corruption at mid-level government 
bodies). More generally, the pioneering episode of mandated CSR represented by Section 135 
provides both a new source of quasi-experimental evidence and highlights the need for new 
conceptual frameworks to understand the wider implications of CSR. However, we emphasize 
that our paper focuses on assessing the firm value, CSR spending and other outcomes of a rule 
mandating CSR in India. Our results cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the effects of 
voluntary CSR spending or to the social value (rather than private firm value) of CSR.8 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the legislative history of the 
Companies Act of 2013 and identifies the key event dates. Section 3 presents a simple model of 
CSR spending. Section 4 describes the dataset and presents the empirical strategy and results. 
Section 5 discusses the implications of the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2) The Legislative History of the Companies Act of 2013 and of Section 135 
 India is the first country to require that some firms spend a percentage of their profits on 
socially responsible activities (as designated by law), or explain why they do not. This rule is 
part of Section 135 of the Companies Act 2013, which lays out the approach to CSR in two 
broad steps – first, by specifying which firms are subject to Section 135, and second, by 
specifying the obligations of these firms. Section 135 only applies to firms that satisfy at least 
                                                 
8 Indeed, some prior research has found evidence that voluntary CSR in the US is profitable and valuable to firms 
and to society (e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim 2015; Flammer 2015). 
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one of three thresholds in any financial year – either having net worth (the face value of shares 
originally issued by the corporation, adjusted for subsequent retained earnings and various 
reserves) exceeding INR 5 billion (~USD 77 Million),9 turnover (i.e., sales) exceeding INR 10 
billion (~USD 154 Million), or net profits exceeding INR 50 million (~USD 770,000).10 All 
publicly traded and privately held firms with operations in India (including foreign-owned firms) 
are subject to Section 135 if they cross any of the thresholds.11 Moreover, the “in any financial 
year” language appears to indicate that these thresholds apply going forward from the effective 
date of the Companies Act 2013. 
If a firm crosses any of these thresholds, then:  
(i) it must constitute a “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) committee with 3 
directors, of which one must be independent, 12 
(ii) it must disclose the composition of the CSR committee, 13 
(iii) the CSR committee must formulate a CSR policy recommending the kinds and 
amounts of CSR spending the firm is to pursue and the committee must monitor that 
policy,14  
(iv) the Board is to approve and publicize the firm’s CSR policy (after taking into 
account the CSR committee’s recommendations) and to ensure that the policy is 
followed,15 and  
(v) the Board is to ensure that the firm spends at least 2% of the firm’s average net 
profits (over the last 3 years) on activities listed in the firm’s CSR Policy or provide 
reasons for why this spending level was not achieved (i.e., a “comply-or-explain” 
rule).16 
 
                                                 
9 Net worth is based on a firm’s “paid up share capital” (the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the face 
value at which the share certificates were originally issued), but also takes account of the face value of preferred 
stock, and adjusts for retained earnings and various reserves (see Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). 
10 Section 135 (1), Companies Act 2013.  The US Dollar totals are based on an exchange rate of 1 USD = 65 INR. 
11 Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules (2014) (hereinafter 
CSR Rules).  
12 Id. 
13 Section 135 (2), Companies Act 2013. 
14 Section 135 (3), Companies Act 2013. 
15 Section 135 (4), Companies Act 2013. 
16 Section 135 (5), Companies Act 2013.  Section 135 (5) also notes that the firm should give preference to CSR 
spending in its local areas; this has generated some negative commentary (Afsharipour and Rana, 2014). 
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It is noteworthy that the “comply-or-explain” rule only applies to the amount spent on 
CSR (i.e., 2% of average net profits); the other requirements (items (i) to (iv)) are mandatory and 
failure to meet them would trigger liability regardless of what explanation was provided.  Failure 
to meet the 2% spending requirement would not trigger liability if an acceptable explanation for 
failing to meet it was provided (although it is not entirely clear to whom such an explanation 
must be provided and what the standard of “acceptability” is). If such an explanation is not 
provided and the firm failed to spend at least 2% of average net profits on CSR activities then 
liability would be triggered here too.  The penalty on the firm and every officer of the firm who 
violates Section 135 is INR 10,000 for the first day of the violation plus an additional INR 1,000 
a day if the violation continues.17  
Finally, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has promulgated a set of rules in 2014 
that provides a list of the activities that satisfy the requirement for CSR spending.18 The activities 
listed are very broad and cover a large swath of what is typically considered CSR and perhaps 
more (e.g., spending on education, health, poverty eradication, environment, arts, gender 
equality, reducing other inequalities, some designated government programs, funds for 
technology incubators in Government Academic institutions),19 thereby leaving firms with 
considerable discretion in directing their CSR spending. However, the MCA’s rules do not count 
as CSR spending those expenditures that would have been undertaken in the normal course of 
business, that are meant to benefit employees or political parties, or that relate to activities 
occurring outside of India.20 
 Section 135 is part of the Companies Act 2013, which has been the subject of discussion 
for quite some time. Prior to the 2013 Act, India’s Companies Law was governed by the 
Companies Act 1956 and there had been considerable interest in overhauling it since India began 
the process of liberalizing its economy in the 1990s.21 The first public intimation of the 
                                                 
17 Section 450, Companies Act 2013 (also attaching liability to other persons who are in default).  Although it is not 
clear who is to enforce Section 135 from its wording, one can assume that it is the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. 
Note that if the violation is repeated within a 3 year period the fine can be doubled – Section 451, Companies Act 
2013. 
18 CSR Rules (2014). These rules become part of Schedule VII of the Companies Act 2013. 
19 CSR Rules (2014). 
20 CSR Rules (2014).  These rules also note that CSR activities can be undertaken through a third party registered 
society, trust or Section 8 (of the Companies Act) entity, or by a similar entity of the firm, or via collaboration with 
other firms or entities. 
21 The Irani Committee Report (2005) proposed a series of changes to India’s Companies Law that would have 
granted firms greater power to customize corporate governance to suit their ends. Although the report did not 
8




Government’s interest in socially responsible spending by firms came in December 2009 when 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released a voluntary code on corporate social 
responsibility that exhorted firms to engage in socially responsible behavior (CSR Voluntary 
Guidelines (2009)).22 These voluntary guidelines did not appear to have much effect - CSR 
activity was by no means common among Indian firms even after the 2009 guidelines 
(Afsharipour, 2011; Van Zile, 2012).23 
 An important news story on August 6, 2010 revealed that the Government was planning 
to enact a new provision in the Companies Law that would require firms above certain thresholds 
to develop a CSR Policy to ensure that they contributed at least 2% of their annual net profits to 
CSR.24 The thresholds quoted in the news story are precisely the same ones that became part of 
Section 135, as is the 2% requirement. No other provision in the Companies Act or earlier 
Companies Bills used these thresholds. Thus, this is – to the best of our knowledge - the first 
time the market learned of a mandatory CSR requirement, the amount involved, and the 
applicable thresholds. The news story does not, however, discuss the possibility of requiring a 
CSR committee. 
                                                                                                                                                             
contain any provisions on CSR, it did note that corporations were expected to contribute not just to the economic 
well-being of the country but also to its social well-being. 
22 Although the voluntary guidelines did not require firms to engage in CSR, they brought into focus concerns that 
had been percolating for some time. These included concerns that India’s phased liberalization program, that began 
in earnest around 1991, may have benefited only a small subset of players in the economy, that income inequality 
had grown, and that the “business sector also needs to take the responsibility of exhibiting socially responsible 
business practices that ensures the distribution of wealth and well being of the communities in which the business 
operates” (CSR Voluntary Guidelines (2009, p. 5)). Absent some attempts to balance these effects (such as a CSR 
initiative), continuing liberalization was likely to face some strong political headwinds (Van Zile, 2012). Moreover, 
academic discussion in India seemed to be moving toward a “trusteeship” model of governance that appeared more 
likely to facilitate CSR regulation (Balasubramanian, 2010). 
23 See Standing Committee on Finance, Twenty-First Report (The Companies Bill, 2009), Lok Sabha, Clause 49, 
available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Companies%20Bill%202009.pdf. See also Times Foundation, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Practices in India (2010). Available at 
http://timesfoundation.indiatimes.com/articleshow/4662536.cms.   
See also Viji Sundaram, Vinod Khosla To Donate Half His Fortune to Charity, New America Media, May 18, 2011.  
Available at: http://ethnoblog.newamericamedia.org/2011/05/vinod-khosla-to-donate-half-his-fortune-to-
charity.php. 
24 See Mandatory CSR not a great idea, feels India Inc., MONEYCONTROL, CNBC-TV18 News, August 6, 2010.  
Available at: http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/mandatory-csr-notgreat-idea-feels-india-
inc_475926.html.   This was also discussed in a closely followed Blog website on corporate matters in India.  See 
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The response of Indian business (often known collectively as “India Inc.”) to this 
proposal was decidedly negative.25 In short order, the Confederation of Indian Industry (a very 
large trade group) came out against such a rule, as did others.26 These concerns not only reflected 
worries about mandating behavior previously thought to be voluntary, but also concerns that the 
CSR mandate might signal instability in the overall liberalization process. Despite the negative 
reaction of India Inc., the draft of the proposed CSR requirement put forward by the Standing 
Committee of Finance on September 8, 2010 largely tracks the news report of August 6, 2010. 
However, it appears to be silent on a penalty for non-compliance, preferring to rely on disclosure 
of non-compliance as the remedy.27  However, by December 24, 2010 news reports indicate that 
the Government began to back away from its mandatory CSR requirement and now seemed to be 
adopting a “comply-or-explain” rule rather than a mandatory one.28 This was largely confirmed 
by February 10, 2011 when news reports emerged that the MCA was planning to accept the 
Standing Committee on Finance’s recommendations on CSR but would rely on a “comply-or-
explain” rule as its enforcement mechanism on the 2% spending requirement.29 More 
commentary on the move away from mandatory CSR appeared on March 14, 2011.30 
The discussion of the mandatory or comply-or-explain rule was officially settled on July 
11, 2011 when the Companies Bill was tabled in front of the lower house of Parliament (the Lok 
Sabha) containing the provision that became Section 135 and the “comply-or-explain” 
language.31 The Bill sat in the Lok Sabha for some time and was finally enacted by it on 
                                                 
25 As early as the first news reports on August 6, 2010, Indian firms responded with concerns about mandating CSR. 
See MONEYCONTROL, CNBC-TV18 News, August 6, 2010, op. cit. 
26 See Akhila Vijayaraghavan, Indian Industries Oppose Mandatory CSR Reporting, JUST MEANS, August 16, 2010.  
Available at: http://www.justmeans.com/editorials?action=readeditorial&p=26759.  IT CEOs back Premji against 
mandatory CSR, TIMES OF INDIA, March 26, 
2011. Available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-26/software-services/29191926_1_csr-azim-
premji-corporate-social-responsibility; CSR Spend on Cards for India Inc., INDIAN EXPRESS, February 9, 2011. 
Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/2-csr-spend-on-cards-for-india-inc/747860/0.  
27 See India Inc faces 2% CSR levy, BUSINESS STANDARD, September 8, 2010. Available at:  http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-inc-faces-2-csr-levy-110090800022_1.html.  
28 See It’s Their Business, TIMES OF INDIA, December 24, 2010.  Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/Its-Their-Business/articleshow/7152001.cms.  
29 See Sidhartha, Companies Law Set to Mandate 2% CSR Spend, TIMES OF INDIA, February 10, 2011. Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Companies-law-set-to-mandate-2-CSR-spend/articleshow/7464529.cms.  
30 See Akhila Vijayaraghavan, India CSR: 2% Spend No Longer Mandatory, Govt Rules, JUST MEANS, March 14, 
2011 (noting that people should move away from a “mandatory or not” discussion towards a discussion on how CSR 
is a valid business strategy). Available at: http://www.justmeans.com/blogs/india-csr-2-spend-no-longer-mandatory-
govt-rules.  
31 The Companies Bill (Proposed), 2011, No. 121, Lok Sabha, Clause 135, 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/The_Companies_Bill_2011.pdf.  
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December 18, 2012.  The Bill then went to the upper house of Parliament (the Rajya Sabha) and 
was enacted by it on August 8, 2013, receiving Presidential Assent on August 29, 2013.32 A 
summary of the dates on which relevant events and news stories occurred is provided in Table 1. 
 
3) A Simple Model of CSR Spending 
 Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we develop a simple theoretical framework 
for analyzing firms’ decisions regarding CSR spending. Consider a firm that has exogenous 
value 𝑉𝑉�  in the absence of CSR activity. Let 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 be the firm’s expenditures on CSR activity. These 
expenditures are assumed to generate a benefit 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) for firm value (for instance, due to 
favorable publicity). We assume that 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) ≥ 0, allowing for the possibility that CSR spending 
generates no private returns for the firm (i.e. that 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) ≡ 0 for all values of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹). When 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) 
takes on nonzero values, we assume that it is increasing and concave (i.e. that 𝐵𝐵′(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) > 0 and 
𝐵𝐵′′(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) < 0), that 𝐵𝐵(0) = 0, and that lim𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹→0
𝐵𝐵′(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) = ∞; these assumptions imply an interior 
optimum when 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) takes on nonzero values. Taking into account the consequences of CSR 
spending, the value of the firm (denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹) can be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 = 𝑉𝑉� + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹            (1) 
 The firm is assumed to have a controlling shareholder who owns a fraction 𝛼𝛼 < 1 of its 
stock. It is assumed that 𝛼𝛼 is sufficiently large to assure effective control of the firm (for 
instance, 𝛼𝛼 > 0.5). This scenario reflects the ownership structure and governance environment 
that is typical of Indian firms. The controller has exogenous private wealth 𝑊𝑊� , in addition to her 
ownership of the firm’s stock. She is assumed to derive utility 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) from a public good (which 
can be provided by personal charitable activity as well as through firms’ CSR activity). 𝐺𝐺 is the 
aggregate supply of the public good, defined as follows: 
𝐺𝐺 = 𝐷𝐷� + 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 + 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹                      (2) 
𝐷𝐷� is the exogenous amount that is supplied by all other individuals and firms in society (apart 
from the controller and the firm she controls),33 while 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 denotes the amount of personal 
                                                 
32 Other government regulatory agencies were also gearing up for the introduction of CSR requirements.  The 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) – the securities markets regulator – has required since August 13, 
2012 that the top 100 firms produce and disclose “business responsibility reports” and file them with SEBI.  See 
SEBI Circular CIR/CFD/DIL/8/2012, August 13, 2012. 
33 𝐷𝐷� is assumed to be exogenous for simplicity, and because the charitable activities of the controller and her firm 
are typically likely to be small in relation to the aggregate amount of charitable activity. However, it is possible that 
the charitable activity of a particularly wealthy and influential controller may induce others to contribute, especially 
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contributions to the public good made by the controller. In a complete analysis, both 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 and 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 
would be chosen simultaneously by the controller. However, our dataset does not enable us to 
link firms’ CSR activity with personal charitable activities by firms’ controlling families or 
individuals. Thus, in the analysis that follows, we generally treat 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 as being fixed (and denote 
this fixed value by ?̅?𝑥𝑃𝑃).  
We assume that 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺)  ≥ 0, allowing for the possibility that the controller does not derive 
any utility from the public good (i.e. that 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) ≡ 0 for all values of 𝐺𝐺). When 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) takes on 
nonzero values, we assume that it is increasing and concave (i.e. that 𝑢𝑢′(𝐺𝐺) > 0 and 𝑢𝑢′′(𝐺𝐺) < 0), 
that 𝑢𝑢(0) = 0, and that lim
𝐺𝐺→0
𝑢𝑢′(𝐺𝐺) = ∞; these assumptions imply an interior optimum when 
𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) takes on nonzero values. The controller’s payoff consists of her utility (if any) from the 
public good,34 her personal wealth (net of any personal spending on the public good), and her 
pro rata share of the firm’s value. Assuming for simplicity an additively separable quasi-linear 
functional form, her payoff (denoted 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶) can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 = 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) + 𝑊𝑊� − ?̅?𝑥𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉� + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹)          (3) 
The controller chooses 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 to maximize 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶; this (privately) optimal choice of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 is denoted by 
𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ . 
As described in Section 2, the general aim of Section 135 is to encourage greater CSR 
activity by firms. In view of this, it is somewhat paradoxical that one of the central conclusions 
that emerges from the framework presented here is that firms will typically engage in too much 
CSR activity, from the perspective of minority shareholders, when the controller has altruistic 
preferences (i.e. when 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) is nonzero). To illustrate this point, assume that both 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) and 
𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) are nonzero, and consider the first-order condition (FOC) for 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ : 
 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹







In contrast, the FOC for the choice of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 that maximizes the value of the firm is: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹
(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) = 1. 
As 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) is concave, 𝛼𝛼 > 0, and 𝑢𝑢′(𝐺𝐺) > 0 by assumption, 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗  will in general exceed the choice 
                                                                                                                                                             
when there exist network effects (Flammer 2015) or increasing returns to scale for certain types of charitable 
activity.  
34 As the controller is assumed to care about the aggregate value of 𝐺𝐺 (rather than about her own contributions), this 
model is one of “pure” altruism. However, the results would not be fundamentally different if we were to 
incorporate “impure” altruism or “warm-glow” preferences (Andreoni, 1990), in which the controller also derives 
utility from the amount of her own contributions and/or from the amount spent by the firm on CSR activity. 
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of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 that maximizes firm value (i.e. that maximizes 𝑉𝑉� + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹).35 Intuitively, this result 
holds because (given that 𝛼𝛼 < 1) the controller bears only a fraction of the cost of CSR activity, 
while gaining not only her pro rata share of any increase in firm value, but also additional utility 
from the satisfaction of altruistic preferences. In essence, an altruistic controller shifts part of the 
cost of satisfying altruistic preferences to minority shareholders. 
 There are a number of important caveats to this claim. First, it is possible that CSR 
activity may be socially valuable (when its benefits are aggregated across society) even though it 
is excessive from minority shareholders’ perspective. However, CSR activity by firms does not 
necessarily increase the supply of the public good. If both 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 and 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 are chosen simultaneously 
by the controller and are perfect substitutes, then the firm’s CSR activity would completely 
“crowd out” personal contributions and the aggregate supply 𝐺𝐺 of the public good would be 
unaffected by the choice of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹. In practice, however, the reputational or other consequences of 
personal and corporate charitable activity may well be quite different. Under such circumstances, 
firms’ CSR activity will increase the total supply 𝐺𝐺, with only partial crowd-out of personal 
charitable activity. Second, the model implicitly assumes that the activity on which CSR 
spending occurs is not valued by minority shareholders. If so, excessive CSR activity will be 
capitalized into minority shareholders’ valuation of the firm. If minority shareholders derive 
utility from the firm’s CSR activity, they will view the satisfaction of their altruistic preferences 
as a form of implicit payout. As in the Modigliani-Miller theory of CSR developed by Zivin and 
Small (2005), CSR activity will not reduce minority shareholders’ valuation of the firm 
(although they may make offsetting adjustments to their personal charitable activities). 
 The maximized value of the firm (given the controller’s privately optimal choice of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ ) 
can be denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹∗: 
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹∗ = 𝑉𝑉� + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗) − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗              (5) 
Suppose that a legal provision such as Section 135 is introduced, requiring that firms set 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹 ≥ ?̅?𝑥, 
where ?̅?𝑥 is a minimum level of CSR spending (such as the 2% of net profits specified in Section 
135).36 Section 135 also imposed mandatory requirements on firms, such as the establishment of 
                                                 
35 If 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) ≡ 0 (while the controller has altruistic preferences), the FOC is: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺
(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗) = 𝛼𝛼. This also leads to a choice 
of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗  by the controller that exceeds the zero level of spending on CSR that would maximize firm value. 
36 This characterization greatly simplifies Section 135, which (as described in Section 2) is imposed on a “comply-
or-explain” basis. However, the initial proposal of August 6, 2010 framed the CSR provision as involving a 
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a Board committee on CSR and the disclosure of CSR-related information. Firms may incur 
various types of compliance costs as a result, along with costs associated with the diversion of 
managerial time and effort, and fees for CSR consultants. These various types of costs are 
summarized by a fixed cost 𝑘𝑘 > 0 that is incurred by firms in the new legal regime, and that is 
independent of how much CSR activity the firm chooses.37 
 If the firm is already engaged in a higher level of CSR spending than required under the 
new law (i.e. 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ ≥ ?̅?𝑥), then its behavior will be unaffected and there will be no impact on firm 
value.38 We focus in the analysis below on the scenario in which the new law is binding – i.e. 
where 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ < ?̅?𝑥. Firm value under the new legal regime, denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135, can be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 = 𝑉𝑉� + 𝐵𝐵(?̅?𝑥) − ?̅?𝑥 − 𝑘𝑘             (6) 
One focus of our empirical analysis is on the impact of Section 135 on firm value. The change in 
value for firms that were initially spending less than ?̅?𝑥 on CSR can be represented by Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 =
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 − 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹∗. Using Equations (5) and (6), Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 is: 
Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 = 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ − ?̅?𝑥 − 𝑘𝑘 + 𝐵𝐵(?̅?𝑥) − 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗)          (7) 
From the assumptions made above, it follows that Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 < 0:39 i.e. the impact of the new law 
on firm value is negative. 
 In our dataset, the vast majority of smaller and medium-sized Indian firms (including 
those around the size thresholds at which Section 135 applied) did not report any CSR activity. 
Based on anecdotal evidence of the rarity of CSR among these firms and on common practice for 
similar variables, we treat missing CSR observations as indicating the absence of CSR activity 
                                                                                                                                                             
mandatory level of spending. As the event study analysis of firm value below focuses on this August 6, 2010 event, 
we use this mandatory formulation in the model to characterize the impact on firm value of this announcement. 
37 Compliance may also entail variable costs that are increasing in the amount spent on CSR. However, the primary 
focus here is on firms that previously undertook little or no CSR activity and are required to spend ?̅?𝑥 (see Equation 
(8) below). Thus, the variable cost of spending ?̅?𝑥 is difficult to distinguish from the fixed cost. 
38 The model abstracts from some factors that may cause firms that were previously spending more than the required 
amount to change their behavior. For instance, ?̅?𝑥 may establish a new focal point or change social norms, or the 
returns to reputational signaling via CSR may change under the new legal regime. Our empirical analysis finds that 
some large firms that were spending more than 2% of their net profit on CSR activity prior to Section 135 reduced 
their CSR spending after the law came into effect. Various possible extensions to the model that might explain this 
finding are discussed in Section 5 below. 
39 The FOC in Equation (4) implies that 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗  is at least as large as the value of 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹  that maximizes [𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹]. The 
new law requires that the firm increase 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹  from 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗  to ?̅?𝑥; the incremental benefit to firm value from doing so is 
𝐵𝐵(?̅?𝑥) − 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗). As 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗  is initially above the firm-value-maximizing level of CSR, this increase moves it even further 
from the firm-value-maximizing optimum. Therefore, the incremental benefit is necessarily smaller than the 
incremental cost (?̅?𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ ). Moreover, 𝑘𝑘 > 0 by assumption. Thus, it follows that Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 < 0. 
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(see Section 4 below for a more detailed discussion). Thus, for the typical firm around the size 
thresholds at which Section 135 applied, 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ = 0. Under the assumptions specified above, this 
observation implies that the controlling shareholder is not altruistic (i.e. 𝑢𝑢(𝐺𝐺) ≡ 0) and that the 
firm derives no private returns from CSR activity (i.e. 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) ≡ 0). In these circumstances, 
Equation (7) can be simplified to:    
       Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 = −?̅?𝑥 − 𝑘𝑘                                  (8) 
Equation (8) provides a basic characterization of the expected change in firm value for most 
firms, which were not engaging in any CSR activity prior to the law (i.e. firms for which 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ =
0).40 
This analysis is useful in guiding the interpretation of the estimates obtained in Section 4. 
Equation (8) implies that a CSR mandate will reduce the value of firms by an amount that is at 
least as large as the amount they are required to spend; the effect may potentially be even larger 
due to compliance costs. This framework also provides some insight into the magnitude of 
private returns to firms from CSR activity. If private returns are small, we would expect an 
impact on firm value that is comparable to (or even larger than) the mandated spending amount 
(as in Equation (8)). If private returns are larger, we would expect a substantially smaller impact, 
along the lines of Equation (7). Furthermore, the crowd-out of personal charitable activity by the 
controller is not likely to be a significant concern – the observation that 𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹∗ = 0 suggests that 
controllers are not altruistic (or at least that personal charitable activity and CSR are not 
substitutes from their perspective) and so will not adjust their level of personal charitable 
activity. 
Finally, note that the analysis so far has ignored taxes. CSR expenditures are in most 
cases business costs that are tax-deductible under Indian tax law. Section 135 does not address 
tax-deductibility, and its enactment did not change the tax-deductibility of CSR spending. If we 
denote the corporate tax rate by 𝜏𝜏 and assume the tax-deductibility of CSR spending (but not of 
the associated compliance costs), then Equation (8) becomes: Δ𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
§135 = −(1 − 𝜏𝜏)?̅?𝑥 + 𝑘𝑘; the 
observed decline in value reflects the lost after-tax (rather than pretax) cash flows and so would 
be correspondingly smaller in magnitude. 
                                                 
40 Strictly speaking, the observed decline in value reflects the change in minority shareholders’ valuation of the firm. 
However, since the costs of Section 135 are borne pro rata in our framework by controlling and minority 
shareholders, we ignore this distinction. 
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4) Empirical Analysis 
 4.1) Data 
The dataset for this study was obtained from two sources. First, the data on financial 
statement variables (such as net profits, sales and net worth), daily share prices and other 
relevant information is obtained from the Prowess database. Prowess is a comprehensive 
database on publicly traded Indian firms that is maintained by the Center for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy. Importantly, Prowess includes a number of variables relating to expenditures 
on “Social and Community” activities and “Environment-related” activities. We use these 
variables to construct proxies for CSR spending. It should be noted, however, that these CSR-
related variables are only available for fiscal years 2012-2015 for a relatively limited number of 
firms. Stock price data is available in Prowess for each trading day. Financial statement variables 
are reported on an annual basis, as of the end of each fiscal year (i.e., March 31 of a given year). 
Thus, the data for fiscal year 2010 reflects results from April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010. In the 
event study analysis, we match the event date to the closest corresponding fiscal year to obtain 
the required financial statement data (for instance, the August 6, 2010 event date is matched to 
the 2010 fiscal year, which is the most recently completed fiscal year as of that event date). 
Our second source of data is the Business Responsibility Reports of the 100 largest firms 
in India that were filed with the securities market regulator – the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI). These disclosures were required due to a circular issued by SEBI in August 
2012.41 The Business Responsibility Reports provide a more direct measure of CSR activity than 
we can construct using Prowess data; however, they are only available for the 100 largest firms. 
We hand-code the business responsibility (i.e., CSR) expenditures of these 100 firms for the 
2014 and 2015 fiscal years (before and after Section 135 came into effect). 
4.2) The Impact of Section 135 on Firm Value 
Event studies use a variety of approaches to estimate firms’ normal or predicted returns. 
We use the market model, which does not rely on any specific economic assumptions. Using 
daily stock price data from Prowess, we compute abnormal returns for the firms in our sample 
over a (-3, +3) event window for each of the events identified in Section 2 (i.e. we consider the 
market reaction over a period extending from 3 trading days prior to the event to 3 trading days 
                                                 
41 See SEBI Circular CIR/CFD/DIL/8/2012, August 13, 2012. 
16




following the event). This event window accommodates some degree of anticipation prior to the 
event, and allows some scope for delayed reactions. 
The market model uses daily returns for each firm i and for the market, and can be 
represented as follows (e.g. Bhagat and Romano, 2002, p. 146; Dharmapala and Khanna, 2016): 
        𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                            (9) 
where Rit is firm i’s return on day t, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the market return on day t, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the error term. 
We run this regression separately for each firm over an estimation window that consists of a year 
of daily returns data prior to the event window. We use the results to compute a predicted return 
for each firm on each day of the relevant event window. We then subtract this predicted return 
from the actual return on each day of the event window to obtain the abnormal return for each 
firm i on each of these days. These abnormal returns are then summed to compute cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for each firm for the event window. 
 The quasi-experimental variation in this study is attributable to the use in Section 135 of 
specific bright-line thresholds to determine the applicability of the CSR provision. As noted 
previously, the threshold for the application of Section 135 is multi-faceted, based on turnover, 
net profits and net worth. The net worth and sales thresholds are set at levels that apply to around 
a quarter of Indian firms, while the net profit threshold is set around the profits earned by the 
median firm (and so applies to about half of the firms in the Prowess database). It is thus 
typically the net profit threshold that is binding - virtually all firms that satisfy the net worth or 
sales thresholds also satisfy the profit threshold, whereas many firms satisfy the net profit 
threshold without satisfying the other criteria. We therefore focus on the net profit threshold in 
our primary empirical tests and discuss why this is a particularly powerful identification strategy 
after presenting our main results.42 
 An RD design can be implemented statistically in a number of different ways. A 
particularly influential approach is the use of nonparametric local polynomial regressions (e.g. 
Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw, 2001; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a), hereafter 
CCT). A local polynomial regression involves fitting a weighted least squares regression to each 
observation, using data from a neighborhood close to that observation; this data is weighted in 
                                                 
42 In order to ensure that these tests use only firms for which the net profit threshold is relevant, we exclude from the 
analysis any firm that satisfies either the sales or the net worth threshold. This exclusion affects very few firms close 
to the net profit threshold – for instance, in the OLS implementation of the RD design that is restricted to firms with 
net profit in the range INR zero to 100 million (see Table 5 below), only 3 firms are excluded because they meet 
either the sales or net worth criteria. 
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some specific way by the distance to the observation of interest. Weighting the data requires a 
choice of “bandwidth” – i.e. the width of the set of observations used for the regression. There 
are a number of approaches to the selection of the bandwidth (e.g. Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 
2012); our reported results use a bandwidth that optimizes mean squared error. 
Intuitively, the nonparametric local polynomial regression approach involves estimating 
local polynomial regressions separately above and below the threshold. The RD treatment effect 
is estimated as the difference in the values of the regression functions at the threshold. 
Observations are weighted by their proximity to the cutoff, with observations close to the 
threshold receiving more weight. CCT (2014a) develop a new approach to estimating confidence 
intervals for RD estimators based on local polynomial regressions, which is used in deriving 
robust standard errors in the analysis below.43 
 The intuition underlying this RD approach (and our result on firm value) can be 
illustrated by Figure 1. This plots the CARs around the August 6, 2010 event date for firms that 
reported net profit in fiscal year 2010 in the range of INR 40 million to INR 60 million, 
representing a range of net profit centered on and close to the INR 50 million cutoff. The CARs 
are Winsorized on both sides at 5% in order to address potential outliers. The three different 
figures show local polynomial regression functions estimated separately above and below the 
cutoff, using polynomials of order 1, 2, and 3, respectively.44 As might be expected given the 
noise associated with stock returns, the plot of the CARs is quite scattered, and does not 
immediately suggest a sharp break at the threshold. However, all three panels of Figure 1 show a 
substantial difference in the values of the regression functions at the threshold. This pattern 
implies a negative RD estimate of the impact of Section 135 on firm value, and this appears to be 
robust to the choice of the order of the polynomial. 
 Table 2 reports the RD estimates obtained using a local polynomial regression approach 
for each of the event dates of interest.45 The first announcement of a mandatory CSR 
requirement (using the thresholds that we have described) occurred on August 6, 2010. Our RD 
                                                 
43 CCT (2014b) provide a Stata command (“rdrobust”) that implements their approach and other commonly-used 
approaches to RD estimation using local polynomial regressions; we use this package in generating the RD 
estimates described below. 
44 There is no generally optimal order of the polynomial, so we illustrate regression functions using polynomials of 
three different orders. 
45 These estimates are obtained using the Stata command “rdrobust” (CCT, 2014b), with a triangular kernel, 
bandwidth selected to optimize mean squared error, and a third-order polynomial. The results are mostly similar 
using lower-order polynomials. 
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estimate indicates a substantial decrease in firm value around that date for firms that were 
expected to be affected by the CSR mandate. The estimate implies a reduction in firm value of 
3.3%, relative to unaffected firms. This is of borderline statistical significance, using the CCT 
(2014a) approach to computing robust standard errors. In particular, the z-statistic is -1.84 and 
the p-value is 0.066, implying significance at the 7% level. While its statistical significance is 
admittedly only marginal, it should be borne in mind that data on abnormal stock returns is 
intrinsically very noisy and thus some imprecision in the estimates might be expected. 
We also undertake a number of placebo tests that involve positing a (nonexistent) legal 
threshold at some other value of net profit. Figure 2 illustrates a placebo test around INR 100 
million, and plots CARs around August 6, 2010 for firms that reported net profit in fiscal year 
2010 in the range of INR 90 million to INR 110 million. There is little difference in the values of 
the regression functions at this placebo “threshold.” Table 3 reports the RD estimates for placebo 
tests at the INR 100 million and INR 150 million net profit levels for August 6, 2010 (using a 
local polynomial regression approach). The results at these placebo “thresholds” are statistically 
insignificant and the coefficients are quite small. 
On December 24, 2010, media reports emerged of a relaxation in the CSR mandate 
towards a “comply-or-explain” obligation. As shown in Table 2, the RD estimate for this event 
date entails a positive market reaction of 1.2% for firms affected by the CSR provision, relative 
to unaffected firms. This estimate, however, is not statistically significant.46 Table 2 also reports 
the RD estimates for the subsequent event dates. All of these are statistically insignificant and 
mostly quite small in magnitude. 
In addition to the nonparametric local polynomial regression illustrated above, we also 
use a straightforward ordinary least-squares (OLS) implementation of our RD design as an 
additional robustness test. This involves running the following OLS regression: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽§135𝑖𝑖 +  𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) + 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖           (10) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the CAR computed for firm i around August 6, 2010. The function 𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) is a 
polynomial function of the three variables that determine the applicability of Section 135 – net 
profit, sales, and net worth, respectively; the reported results use quadratic functions of these 
variables. The variable of interest, §135𝑖𝑖 , is an indicator = 1 if Section 135 applies, and 0 
                                                 
46 The estimated effect around December 24, when combined with the estimated effect around August 6, would 
imply about a -2% net effect of the comply-or-explain CSR obligation. However, the insignificance of the December 
24 result makes it difficult to draw this conclusion with any substantial degree of confidence. 
19
Dharmapala and Khanna:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
19 
 
otherwise. As firms that satisfy the sales or net worth criteria are excluded from the sample, 
§135𝑖𝑖= 1 when 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 > INR 50 million. 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables (in the reported results, 
these are total assets, advertising expenditures, and export earnings), 𝛼𝛼 is a constant, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the 
error term. The sample is restricted to firms with net profit in the range of zero to INR 100 
million in fiscal year 2010, to ensure that the estimate is based only on firms relatively close to 
the threshold. 
The OLS implementation of the RD design leads to quite similar conclusions. Table 4 
provides descriptive statistics for CARs around August 6, 2010 and for control variables in fiscal 
year 2010. Table 5 reports RD estimates using the OLS specification in Equation (10) for firms 
in the zero to INR 100 million net profit band. Column 1 shows that firms to which Section 135 
applies experience a firm value decline of about 2.6%, relative to unaffected firms. This is 
marginally significant; the t-statistic is -1.79 and the p-value is 0.074, indicating significance at 
about the 8% level. The magnitude is quite similar to that of the corresponding estimate in Table 
3.  
In principle, the model in Section 3 implies that this decline in firm value should apply 
only to firms that engaged CSR spending below 2% of net profit. Unfortunately, we do not have 
data on CSR spending in 2010; using the earliest available data (for 2012) and omitting the 19 
firms that spent 2% or more of net profit on CSR in 2012 leads to very similar results to those in 
Column 1.47 The estimated effect among firms that spent 2% or more of net profit on CSR in 
2012 is positive and around 2%, but statistically insignificant (possibly due to the small sample 
size). Such an effect may be consistent with a scenario in which these firms’ controllers were 
originally overspending on CSR from the perspective of minority shareholders (as suggested by 
Equation (4)), and where investors anticipated that CSR spending among such firms would fall 
after Section 135 came into effect (as we find in Section 4.5 below). However, it is difficult to 
reach any firm conclusions due to the statistical insignificance of the estimate. 
The volatility and potential manipulability of profits create two distinct challenges for our 
RD approach. The first is that firms may seek to manipulate net profits in order to remain below 
the threshold. If so, this would violate one of the central assumptions of the RD approach - that 
assignment to the treatment is random close to the threshold. This is primarily a concern for the 
RD analysis of CSR spending in Section 4.3; however, even the RD estimates of the impact on 
                                                 
47 The nonparametric RD estimate is also robust to omitting such firms. 
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firm value may be affected if investors anticipate that firms will manipulate net profits to stay 
below the threshold.  
To test for the manipulation of net profits, we conduct a test for a discontinuity in the 
density of firms at the INR 50 million threshold in 2015. This exercise is in the spirit of 
McCrary’s (2008) test for manipulation of the running variable in RD settings; however, it uses a 
more recent formulation developed by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017). Figure 3 plots the 
density of firms in a region (INR 40-60 million) close to the net profit threshold after Section 
135 had taken effect in 2015. This test shows some apparent bunching below the threshold; 
however, the null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity in the density at the INR 50 million 
threshold cannot be rejected. Thus, while some degree of bunching cannot be ruled out, there is 
no evidence of substantial and statistically significant manipulation of net profits.48 
A second, and distinct, problem is that the volatility of profits may lead investors to 
expect that even firms not currently satisfying the net profit threshold will do so in the near 
future. Market reactions for firms just below the threshold may reflect such expectations. While 
this would primarily create a bias against any findings, we address this issue (as well as the 
possibility of bunching below the threshold) by using an approach known in the health 
economics literature as a “donut-hole” RD design (e.g. Almond and Doyle, 2011). This approach 
involves excluding observations in a region close to the threshold and conducting the RD 
analysis on the remaining observations. In Column 2 of Table 5, we omit observations in the 
range INR 43-50 million and calculate the RD estimate comparing observations around INR 43 
million and those just above INR 50 million.49 The results are very similar to those in Column 1. 
Finally, it is possible that the effect may differ across firms with differing characteristics. 
For instance, firms with less final customer interaction may have lower gains from CSR 
spending (e.g. Servaes and Tamayo, 2015). To test for this, we proxy for final customer 
interaction by using advertising expenses as reported in Prowess. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 
divide firms that have net profits ranging from 0 to INR 100 million into two subsamples – one 
                                                 
48 To the extent that Section 135 imposes sizeable costs, the apparent absence of substantial bunching may seem 
surprising. Note, however, that the costs of manipulating profits may also be substantial, and the present value of the 
benefits from bunching may be limited if firms anticipate that they will only be able to remain below the threshold 
for a small number of years (for instance, due to natural growth in size). It should also be remembered that (as 
described in Section 2) firms are required to spend 2% of an income measure that is averaged over the last 3 years; 
this reduces the benefits of bunching in any particular year. 
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(in Column 3) where firms have zero or missing advertising expenses (suggesting little final 
customer interaction) and the other (in Column 4) where firms have positive advertising 
expenses. Column 3 reports a firm value decline of 3.5% (which is marginally significant at the 
10% level) for firms with zero or missing advertising; Column 4 reports an insignificant effect 
(with a much smaller coefficient) for firms with positive advertising. This is consistent with the 
negative firm value effect being largely concentrated among firms with zero or missing 
advertising expenses. As discussed further in Section 4.4, one potential explanation might be that 
firms with more advertising expenses could reduce their “advertising expenses” and increase 
their “CSR spending” (i.e., substitute between advertising and CSR spending). 
Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) also undertake an event study analysis of Section 135. 
There are a number of significant differences between their event study methodology and ours, 
as well as significant differences in the questions we address in our respective papers (e.g., we go 
beyond firm value effects). For instance, they do not use a nonparametric local polynomial 
regression approach in assessing firm value effects. In addition, the precise event dates that they 
identify are somewhat different from ours. They use a somewhat smaller sample of firms 
(restricted to those trading on the National Stock Exchange of India), whereas we use all firms in 
the Prowess database. We interpret our results in the light of the theoretical model in Section 3 
that emphasizes the central role of controlling shareholders, leading to some important 
differences of interpretation. Despite all of these differences, when our analyses overlap the 
results are quite similar; in particular, they also find a substantial negative effect of Section 135 
on firm value. However, Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017) focus only on firm value, whereas we 
engage in a more comprehensive study of the impact of Section 135 on a wide range of 
outcomes, including CSR expenditures (to which we turn next). 
 4.3) The Impact of Section 135 on CSR Expenditures 
The second important question we address is the impact of Section 135 on CSR 
expenditures. As the CSR obligation in Section 135 takes a comply-or-explain form – where 
firms may make no change to their CSR activity and instead provide explanations for why it falls 
below the 2% target - the impact of Section 135 on CSR spending is by no means a trivial 
question. Unfortunately, the empirical estimation of this effect is hampered by limitations of the 
pre-Section 135 data on CSR spending. Most Indian firms were not required to disclose CSR 
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activity until the provision took effect in fiscal year 2015.50 For years starting in 2012, it is 
possible to construct proxies for CSR expenditures from variables reported in the Prowess 
dataset. In particular, the variables “Social and Community” expenditures and “Environment-
related” expenditures appear closely related to CSR, and we add these two categories together to 
construct a proxy for CSR spending.51  
There are a number of important caveats with respect to this measure, especially for fiscal 
years prior to 2015. First, disclosure of these items was voluntary, and thus subject to concerns 
about self-selection. Second, there are a large number of missing observations – for instance, in 
2014, there are 893 non-missing observations for our CSR measure, out of 4628 firms in the 
Prowess database (and there are even fewer observations in earlier years). The simplest approach 
– which we adopt in the analysis below – is to treat missing CSR observations as zeroes, as is 
commonly assumed in the literature for variables such as advertising and R&D; this is also 
consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that CSR activity was small or nonexistent among 
smaller Indian firms.52   
To measure the impact of Section 135 on CSR activity, we use both a difference-in-
difference (DiD) approach (using panel data from Prowess over 2012-2015) and an RD design 
using data for 2015 (described below). The DiD approach tests for changes in CSR spending 
among “treatment” firms that became subject to Section 135 (based on net worth, sales, or net 
profit) in 2015, relative to CSR spending by those (“control”) firms that remained unaffected. 
Figure 4 depicts mean CSR spending by treatment and control firms with net profits between 0 
and INR 100 million over the period 2012-2015. There is a marked increase in CSR spending by 
treatment firms from 2014 to 2015. However, treatment firms’ CSR spending exhibits more 
volatility prior to the implementation of Section 135, so the inference of an effect from the visual 
inspection of Figure 4 should be drawn with some caution. 
The basic empirical specification for the DiD analysis is the following: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽(§135𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅2015𝑖𝑖) +  𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (11) 
                                                 
50 The largest 100 firms constitute an exception, and data for these firms is analyzed separately in Section 4.5 below. 
51 A third category reported in Prowess (“Donations”) may also overlap with CSR. However, it is unclear whether 
the donations typically made by firms fall within the definition of CSR provided in Schedule VII of the Companies 
Act 2013. Thus, we exclude “Donations” from our baseline measure. However, the results are similar when 
“Donations” are included in the CSR measure.  
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where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is our measure of CSR activity (described above) for firm i in year t; this is 
Winsorized from above at 5% to address potential outliers. §135𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if firm i met at least one of the net worth, sales or net profit thresholds in year t (and zero 
otherwise). 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅2015𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 in 2015, when Section 135 came into 
effect (and zero otherwise). As §135𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the thresholds are satisfied, even in years prior to 
the implementation of Section 135, it is the interaction term §135𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅2015𝑖𝑖 that reflects the 
applicability of the new law, and the basic hypothesis is that β > 0. The terms μi and δt are firm 
and year fixed effects, respectively, and νit is the error term. Xit is a vector of control variables, 
which includes total assets, advertising expenditures (treating missing observations as zeroes), 
and export earnings (treating missing observations as zeroes). As the “treatment” depends on net 
profit, net worth and sales, we include linear and squared terms of each of these variables as 
controls. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for CSR spending and the control variables. 
It is possible that treatment firms may have experienced faster growth in CSR spending 
even prior to Section 135, and that the estimated DiD effect may represent a continuation of this 
preexisting trend, rather than a causal impact of Section 135. To address this possibility, we add 
firm-specific linear trends in CSR spending (denoted by git, where gi represents the firm-specific 
growth rate in CSR for firm i) to the model in Equation (11). The augmented model can be 
straightforwardly implemented using estimation in first differences (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 
315-316):           
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽∆(§135𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅2015𝑖𝑖) + ∆𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (12) 
where ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1, and other changes are defined analogously; 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 is the year 
effect and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the error term in the first-differenced model (representing the changes in 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, respectively). The firm fixed effect μi in Equation (11) drops out of Equation (12). However, 
the firm-specific trend gi can be estimated by including a firm effect in the estimation of 
Equation (12). 
 Column 1 of Table 7 reports the results of the specification in Equation (11), using a 
panel of Prowess data for the years 2012-2015 with 13,770 observations on nearly 4000 firms. 
The estimated Section 135 treatment effect is statistically significant, and its magnitude is about 
INR 6 million. For purposes of comparison, mean CSR expenditure in 2014 was INR 65 million 
among firms that reported positive CSR. Thus, this result implies that CSR spending rose as a 
consequence of Section 135 by about 9% relative to the mean among firms reporting positive 
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CSR.53 In Column 2, we add several additional control variables, and obtain a very similar 
estimate.  
The analysis so far assumes that missing CSR observations are zeroes. To test whether 
the results are sensitive to this assumption, we estimate Equation (11) for the subsample 
consisting only of firm-years with non-missing CSR expenditures, as reported in Column 3 of 
Table 7. While the sample size is much smaller (consisting of 2108 observations on 915 firms), 
the estimated Section 135 treatment effect is statistically significant; its magnitude is about INR 
9.7 million, representing an increase in CSR spending of about 15% relative to the mean among 
firms reporting positive CSR. Column 4 of Table 7 reports the results of estimating Equation 
(12); this is a first-differenced specification, so the variables should be interpreted as changes 
rather than as levels. The estimated Section 135 treatment effect (relative to the preexisting 
trend) is statistically significant, and its magnitude is very similar to that of the baseline effect in 
Column 1. 
 In addition, we also consider the “extensive margin” of CSR activity – i.e. the fraction of 
firms that engage in any CSR activity. We reinterpret 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in Equation (11) as a dichotomous 
variable, equal to 1 if firm i reports a positive amount of spending on CSR in year t, and zero 
otherwise (all other variables are as defined above). This test is implemented using a linear 
probability model of the probability that a firm engages in CSR activity (although results are 
fairly similar using logit and probit models). Figure 5 depicts the fraction of treatment and 
control firms that have positive CSR spending over 2012-2015. There is clearly a marked 
increase in the fraction of treatment firms with positive CSR spending from 2014 to 2015 
(although this fraction is still quite far below 1, reflecting the comply-or-explain nature of the 
law and possibly also some degree of noncompliance or nonreporting). 
 Column 1 of Table 8 shows that the probability of engaging in CSR increased among 
treatment firms by about 0.33. This is substantial in magnitude and statistically significant, and 
also closely mirrors the graphical evidence in Figure 5. Column 2 of Table 8 restricts the sample 
to observations with net profit in the range INR 0-100 million. Among these smaller firms, the 
increase in the probability of engaging in CSR increased among treatment firms is smaller 
                                                 
53 Two categories of firms that are potentially of particular interest are state-owned and foreign-owned firms. The 
basic result – an increase in CSR spending among firms subject to Section 135 – holds within each of these 
subgroups of firms, and the magnitude of the effect is fairly similar to that for the full sample. The baseline result 
also holds when state-owned and foreign-owned firms are omitted from the sample. 
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(around 0.05), but is also statistically significant and quite large relative to the mean among 
treatment firms in 2014 (of about 0.08). 
An alternative to the DiD approach is an RD design that uses data for 2015 and tests 
whether there is a difference in CSR spending among firms just above and below the net profit 
threshold. The underlying intuition is that the discontinuous application of Section 135 at the 
INR 50 million net profit threshold should lead to a discontinuous jump in CSR spending among 
firms just above the cutoff (assuming that at least some firms comply rather than explain). As in 
the analysis of firm value, we use a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach that 
involves estimating local polynomial regressions separately above and below the cutoff. The RD 
treatment effect of Section 135 on CSR spending is estimated as the difference in the values of 
the regression functions at the threshold. 
Column 1 of Table 9 reports this RD estimate, using data for fiscal year 2015. The 
estimate – an increase in CSR spending of about INR 2.7 million - is very large relative to the 
DiD estimates in Table 7, and is of borderline statistical significance. As the RD estimate applies 
to firms close to the threshold, the most relevant comparison is with mean CSR expenditure in 
2014 among firms with profits less than INR 100 million that reported positive CSR (which was 
INR 1.71 million). The RD estimate implies that CSR spending rose as a consequence of Section 
135 by about 160% relative to the mean among firms in this size category reporting positive 
CSR. We also report a placebo test in Column 2 of Table 9 that involves estimating the same RD 
treatment effect using data for the years 2012-2014, when Section 135 did not apply. As 
expected, this RD estimate is statistically insignificant and much smaller in magnitude than that 
for 2015. Even so, however, the small number of firms reporting positive CSR in the region of 
the threshold makes it difficult to rule out the possibility that the 2015 result is driven by a few 
influential observations. In addition, it is subject to concerns about potential bunching, as 
discussed in Section 4.2. Thus, while we report the result in Table 9 for completeness, it should 
be interpreted with considerable caution. 
4.4) The Impact of Section 135 on Advertising, Sales, and Accounting Performance 
In Table 5, the negative impact of Section 135 on firm value appears to be concentrated 
among firms that do not engage in advertising. One potential explanation - that firms with more 
advertising expenses can more readily substitute CSR spending for advertising - receives support 
from Column 3 of Table 8, which reports DiD estimates from a linear probability model of the 
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impact of Section 135 on the probability of engaging in advertising. The dependent variable is an 
indicator for strictly positive advertising expenses. There is a statistically significant decline in 
the probability of engaging in advertising among firms subject to Section 135, relative to control 
firms. Column 4 restricts the analysis to firms with net profits between 0 and INR 100 million. 
The point estimate here is very similar to that in Column 3, but is no longer statistically 
significant. These findings suggest that there may be some degree of substitutability between 
CSR spending and advertising, although caution is warranted due to the lack of statistical 
significance in Column 4. 
We also examine the impact of Section 135 on the ratio of sales to total assets and on the 
return on assets (ROA, the ratio of net profit to total assets). We use both DiD specifications 
(analogous to Equation (11), but with the dependent variable being the ratio of sales to total 
assets or ROA) and an RD approach around the INR 50 million threshold in 2015. There are no 
robust, consistent and statistically significant results for either of these variables across these 
specifications. Figure 6 plots the ratio of sales to total assets in fiscal year 2015 for firms with net 
profit in the range of INR 40 million to INR 60 million. There is little difference between the 
local polynomial regression functions estimated below and above the cutoff. The apparent 
absence of any causal effect of CSR activity on sales should be interpreted with some caution, 
given the difficulty of establishing a negative result. However, it is consistent with firms 
choosing CSR activity (or the lack thereof) to optimize their sales performance prior to the 
enactment of the new law. 
Figure 7 tells a similar story with respect to ROA in fiscal year 2015. We might expect 
that some types of costs associated with the CSR mandate (such as fees paid to CSR consultants, 
or the distraction of managers from normal business operations) may result in decreases in ROA. 
In a DiD specification, the estimated effect of Section 135 on ROA is quite imprecise. However, 
a modest decline in ROA – of up to 1.5 percentage points, relative to a mean ROA of 11% - as a 
result of Section 135 cannot be ruled out at the 95% level. 
 4.5) Section 135 and the CSR Activity of Large Firms 
Taken in combination, the results in Section 4.3 above imply that Section 135 increased 
CSR activity significantly, especially along the extensive margin. However, it should be noted 
that the results are subject to the self-selection concerns noted earlier, and rely on the assumption 
that missing values are zeroes. For a subsample consisting of the largest 100 firms, the self-
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selection issues can be overcome because India’s securities regulator (SEBI) required these firms 
to disclose their CSR spending in the year prior to the Companies Act 2013 taking effect (i.e. for 
fiscal year 2014) as well as for the year in which it took effect (fiscal year 2015).54 For these 
firms, we hand-collect data on CSR expenditures before and after Section 135 from these 
Business Responsibility disclosures. Unfortunately, despite the mandate from SEBI to disclose 
CSR spending, data is missing for some firms. In addition, the disclosure requirement only 
applied to firms with positive profits (as loss-making firms are exempt from Section 135). 
Ultimately, we obtain data on CSR spending in both 2014 and 2015 for a sample of 55 firms 
(those among the top 100 firms for which there is complete CSR data for both years, and which 
did not experience losses in either year). Of these firms, 10 met or exceeded the 2% target in 
2014, even prior to Section 135 taking effect. The remaining 45 spent less than 2% of net profits 
on CSR in 2014. Descriptive statistics for each category of firms are presented in Table 10. 
Although the sample size is very small, it is apparent from Table 10 that while firms that 
were initially spending less than 2% increased their CSR activity, those that were initially 
spending more than 2% reduced their CSR expenditures after Section 135 came into effect. This 
presumably unintended effect is also apparent in Figure 8, which depicts CSR spending as a 
percentage of net profit for each group of firms for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Firms that were 
initially spending less than 2% increased their CSR spending from about 0.8% of net profit on 
average to about 1.5% of net profit. On the other hand, firms that were initially spending more 
than 2% decreased their CSR spending from about 2.7% of net profit on average to about 2.2% 
of net profit. On balance, however, overall CSR spending among these 55 firms increased from 
2014 to 2015.55 
The apparently conflicting effects of Section 135 on these two groups of firms is further 
illustrated in Table 11. In Column 1 of Table 11, we report the results of the following 
regression: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖                        (13) 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 is the change in CSR expenditures as a percentage of net profit from 2014 to 2015 for 
firm i. 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to one if the firm spent less than 2% of net profit in 2014. The 
                                                 
54 See SEBI Circular CIR/CFD/DIL/8/2012, August 13, 2012. 
55 Aggregate CSR expenditures among firms that were initially spending less than 2% increased from INR 14.1 
billion to INR 22.6 billion. Among firms that were initially spending more than 2%, aggregate CSR expenditures 
fell from INR 16.4 billion to INR 13 billion. Overall, for the entire group of firms, aggregate CSR expenditures rose 
from INR 30.6 billion to INR 35.6 billion. 
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coefficients imply that CSR expenditures as a percentage of net profit fell among firms that were 
initially above 2% by about 0.47 percentage points on average, while they rose among firms that 
were initially below 2% by about 0.65 percentage points on average.56 
A simpler representation of these changes is obtained by dividing the sample into firms 
spending above and below 2% in 2014, and running the following regression separately for each 
group of firms: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖                        (14) 
where ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is a control variable for the change in firm i’s net profits from 2014 to 2015. The 
results in Columns 2 and 3 imply that (controlling for changes in net profit) CSR expenditures as 
a percentage of net profit fell among firms that were initially above 2% by about 0.38 percentage 
points on average, while it rose among firms that were initially below 2% by about 0.64 
percentage points on average. 
Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution, as the sample size is very 
small and the analysis relies on a before-and-after comparison (there is no control group among 
large firms, since they were all subject to Section 135). The main alternative explanation 
involves some form of mean reversion (i.e. that firms with high CSR spending in 2014 tended to 
lower their spending in 2015 and vice versa, for reasons unrelated to Section 135). To test this, 
we examine whether there is a tendency to converge towards the 2% target imposed by Section 
135, or to converge towards the initial mean within this sample. The mean of CSR spending as a 
percentage of net profit is 1.15% in 2014, while the median is 1%; in the analysis below, we use 
the median of 1% for simplicity. 
Column 4 of Table 11 reports a regression analogous to Equation (13); however, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is 
now an indicator equal to one if the firm spent less than 1% of net profit in 2014 (the 
approximate 2014 mean). The sample is restricted to the 45 firms that spent less than 2% in 
2014. The basic idea behind this test is that if this phenomenon were attributable to mean 
reversion, then firms initially above 1% would decrease CSR, while only firms initially below 
1% (rather than 2%) would increase CSR. The results in Column 4 show that CSR expenditures 
as a percentage of net profit rose among firms that were initially above 1% by about 0.4 
percentage points on average, and rose among firms that were initially below 1% by about 0.83 
                                                 
56 The latter is implied by the 1.13 effect of the indicator for being initially below 2%, relative to the firms that were 
initially above 2% and experienced a 0.47 percentage points decline in CSR. 
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percentage points on average.57 Thus, CSR rose both for firms initially below and above 1%, 
contrary to what we would expect under mean reversion, and the increase in CSR for those firms 
initially above 1% is statistically significant. 
Another reason to doubt the mean reversion story is provided by the histograms in Figure 
9, which illustrate the density of firms over CSR spending as a percentage of net profit in 2014 
and 2015. In 2014, there was a quite dispersed distribution. In 2015, it narrows dramatically, 
with a large spike at 2%. This spike appears to draw mass from both the left (firms initially 
spending less than 2%) and the right (firms initially spending more than 2%). A mean reversion 
story cannot easily explain why 2% became such a strong focal point after Section 135. Thus, 
our tests suggest that the decrease in CSR among high-spending firms does not seem attributable 
to mean reversion in CSR spending. We explore various explanations for this presumably 
unintended consequence of Section 135 in Section 5 below. 
 
5) Discussion  
 Before discussing our results in greater detail, it is worth noting some background facts 
about CSR spending in India prior to the enactment of Section 135. The available data suggests 
that most medium-sized Indian firms did not engage in CSR activity. This observation is 
consistent with (and indeed, in our theoretical framework in Section 3, implies) the following. 
First, the controlling shareholders of these firms either do not gain much utility from charitable 
activities, or perceive limited fungibility between personal charitable activity and CSR. From 
this, it follows that mandating CSR spending by firms is unlikely to crowd out controlling 
shareholders’ personal charitable activity (and so will expand the aggregate supply of charitable 
activity). Second, the private returns from CSR activity for medium-sized Indian firms are small. 
Of course, these generalizations do not apply to large firms, most of which engage in some CSR 
activity, with some having done so considerably in excess of the 2% level prior to Section 135. 
With this as background, we discuss our results in greater detail, and examine some of the 
broader implications of India’s experiment with mandatory CSR requirements. 
 5.1) Firm Value Effects 
The first announcement of the proposed mandatory CSR rule caused a decline in firm 
value of about 2.6% to 3.3% (depending on the specification) for treatment firms relative to 
                                                 
57 The latter is implied by the 0.43 effect of the indicator for being initially below 1%, relative to the firms that were 
initially above 1% and experienced a 0.4 percentage points increase in CSR. 
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control firms. A negative effect is not especially surprising; if CSR spending benefited firms, one 
might expect that they would already have been doing it voluntarily. The magnitude of the effect, 
however, provides some important implications. First, the magnitude is comparable to (or even 
larger than) the amount of CSR spending that the provision required. At the time of the 
announcement, the expectation was that the CSR spending requirement would be mandatory, 
rather than being implemented on a comply-or-explain basis. Thus, it is not necessarily puzzling 
that the firm value decline may exceed the required amount of CSR spending. For instance, the 
CSR mandate might be expected to entail significant compliance costs, including those 
associated with the diversion of managers’ and directors’ time and effort from business 
operations, the costs of researching suitable recipients of CSR spending (or hiring consultants to 
do this), and the costs of disclosing CSR activity.58 
Even so, there remains the question of whether the compliance and disclosure costs 
implied by the estimate may be unreasonably large, and of whether any light can be shed on their 
magnitude. To partially address this, we regress the August 6, 2010 CARs on firms’ CSR 
spending in 2015: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅_2015𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖                       (15) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the CAR computed for firm i around August 6, 2010, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅_2015𝑖𝑖 is firm i’s CSR 
spending in fiscal year 2015, 𝛼𝛼 is a constant, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. Assuming that investors 
can (to some degree) predict how much firms will end up spending on CSR once Section 135 
comes into effect, the estimate of the constant 𝛼𝛼 indicates the compliance and disclosure costs 
borne by firms when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅_2015𝑖𝑖 = 0. While this is a rather rough exercise, subject to numerous 
caveats, it enables us to separate out the cash flow effects of CSR spending from the compliance 
and disclosure costs. The estimate of 𝛼𝛼 is about -1%, indicating that a substantial fraction of the 
negative market reaction is attributable to compliance and disclosure costs (along with any 
reputational costs for firms that spend nothing on CSR). 
 Another concern is that the estimated effect on August 6, 2010 would be discounted by 
the probability that the announced policy would ultimately be enacted (and thus that the true 
effect, accounting for this probability, may be implausibly large). However, in a parliamentary 
system, it would generally be expected that the policy favored by the governing coalition (with 
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its parliamentary majority) would eventually be enacted, even though there would have been 
some uncertainty about the timing. It was also widely expected that a new Companies Act (of 
which Section 135 formed a part) would be enacted to update the existing law dating from 1956. 
Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to view the anticipated probability of eventual enactment, as 
of the event date, as being quite close to 1. 
The size of the effect also sheds some light on an important question in the study of CSR 
– the magnitude of firms’ private returns from CSR activity, which has important implications 
for the extent to which governments should subsidize CSR activity, as well as for understanding 
firms’ motivations for CSR. The large decline in the value of firms (relative to the amount of 
CSR required) suggests that the private returns to CSR activity are quite small, at least for Indian 
firms around the threshold. The estimated magnitude is quite consistent with Equation (8), which 
reflects circumstances in which 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) ≡ 0 (i.e. where there are no private returns to CSR 
activity).59 
On the other hand, it is possible that the August 6, 2010 event gave rise to expectations of 
future increases in regulation. This would make it more difficult to interpret the implications of 
the magnitude of the effect. However, it appears unlikely that any such future regulation (or a 
general reversal of liberalization, of the sort described in Section 2) would apply at precisely the 
same thresholds used for Section 135, especially as these thresholds are not used elsewhere in 
Indian company law. 
In general, an important caveat is that our firm value results measure the value to the firm 
of CSR spending, not the social value of such spending. Thus, our results should not be viewed 
as indicating that CSR spending is socially value-destroying. Indeed, in Section 5.4 we discuss 
briefly how India’s mandatory rule might be socially value-enhancing even if it generates 
negative firm value effects.60  
5.2) Compliance and Enforcement 
                                                 
59 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Equation (8) does not take account of the tax-deductibility of CSR 
spending. To the extent that CSR spending is tax-deductible, our estimate represents the after-tax loss of value and 
so may understate the pretax effect. 
60 Indeed, it is possible that if enough firms start engaging in CSR then network effects may develop that make it 
more valuable to firms to engage in CSR (Flammer 2015).  That may not have happened by 2010 in India, but given 
the large increases in CSR spending and the rapidly increasing fraction of firms doing this spending that may happen 
soon. Also, there have been suggestions in the literature in the US that analysts’ perceptions and valuations of CSR 
have changed over time (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015). 
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One important set of concerns about this study relates to the limited enforcement of 
company and securities law in India. While this is an important background consideration, it is 
generally the case that most potential compliance and enforcement problems are likely to create a 
bias against our findings. Moreover, the “comply-or-explain” structure of Section 135 is in many 
ways well-tailored to a weak enforcement environment, relying primarily on disclosure. We thus 
begin by discussing firm’s decisions on whether to spend or to explain their lack of CSR activity. 
We then consider problems arising from possible corruption, fraud, and noncompliance. 
Spending at least 2% of net profits on CSR and spending less but providing an 
explanation of the failure to spend 2% are both alternative forms of compliance with Section 
135. To understand the prevalence and consequences of these choices, we hand-collect data on 
the explanations provided by the largest 100 firms from their Business Responsibility reports. Of 
53 firms with usable data, about one third spend 2% or more, while virtually all the rest provide 
explanations (as required by Section 135). Thus, even among the largest firms, explaining rather 
than spending 2% is common. The explanations provided are generally not very detailed and 
often not particularly compelling. Some common themes include the novelty of the CSR 
requirement and the difficulty of identifying worthy causes on which to spend in the limited time 
available. A number of firms promise to carry forward their shortfall by spending more than 
required in future years. We also run a regression of the August 6, 2010 CAR on an indicator for 
whether firms spent 2% or more in fiscal year 2015 or instead provided an explanation. The 
firms that explained experienced a market reaction that was almost 1 percentage point less 
negative than that for firms that ended up spending 2% or more; however, the difference between 
the effects is not statistically significant. 
A significant concern is that the CSR mandate may give rise to corrupt or fraudulent 
forms of spending, for instance where the firm directs funds towards a fraudulent organization 
that then returns most of the money. If such “kickbacks” were returned to the firm, we would not 
observe (as we do) a substantial negative market reaction. However, if they were directed to the 
controller, then this would amount to a form of controller self-dealing that may give rise to a 
negative market reaction (reflecting minority shareholders’ valuation). However, it should be 
remembered that Section 135 does not create any new opportunities for self-dealing by 
controllers. If CSR spending happens to be an effective mechanism for self-dealing, then 
controllers would already have been engaged in this practice. Thus, if Section 135 gives rise to 
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“kickbacks” of this type, then they would be offset by reductions in other forms of self-dealing. 
It is therefore unlikely that fraudulent forms of CSR spending would confound our basic results. 
Perhaps the most egregious form of noncompliance by firms would be to falsely claim 
CSR expenditures that they had not actually made. This strategy is fraught with difficulty, 
however. The ostensible beneficiaries of the “spending” would be aware that funds had not been 
received and are likely to object. Indeed, even in the absence of enforcement by SEBI or other 
official bodies, India has a quite vibrant business press that would be likely to publicize such 
forms of noncompliance. 
5.3) CSR Spending Effects 
After Section 135 came into effect, there was a significant increase in CSR spending by 
treatment firms relative to control firms, and a particularly large increase in the fraction of 
treatment firms (relative to control firms) that engaged in positive amounts of CSR spending. At 
the same time, we find that the negative effect on firm value seems to have been concentrated 
among firms that had little customer interaction, proxied for by those with zero or missing 
advertising expenses. Further, we find some evidence indicating that the likelihood of advertising 
spending decreased when firms were subject to Section 135. These results collectively indicate 
some degree of substitutability between CSR and advertising, suggesting that the primary benefit 
to Indian firms of CSR spending is inculcating goodwill or good public relations (very much like 
advertising).61 Other benefits of CSR that have been discussed in the literature, such as CSR 
spending insulating firms against government enforcement actions (e.g. Jeffers, 2015; Hong and 
Liskovich, 2016) seem unlikely to hold in the Indian context where such enforcement actions are 
infrequent and often mired in delays. 
The increase in CSR spending was concentrated among firms that spent less than 2% of 
their net profits on CSR prior to Section 135. While there were few firms that spent more than 
2% prior to Section 135, these firms appear to have decreased their CSR spending after Section 
135 came into effect; presumably, this was an unintended and undesired outcome. It is 
particularly interesting because many of these leading CSR firms were opposed to Section 135.62 
                                                 
61 These results suggest that firms with positive advertising reduced their advertising expenditures and increased 
their CSR spending and that these firms suffered a lesser negative firm value effect compared to firms that did no 
advertising, which increased their CSR spending.  Stated this way, it appears the advertising firms were able to 
reduce the cash flow effect of CSR spending by reducing advertising, but the no-advertising firms did not have this 
option. 
62 See MONEYCONTROL, CNBC-TV18 News, August 6, 2010, op cit; INDIACORPLAWBLOG, August 7, 2010, op cit. 
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One explanation is that the firms (and their controllers) might consider the primary benefit of 
CSR to be the goodwill it generates for the firm (or its controlling group), which might be 
negatively impacted by mandated CSR spending. For instance, imagine that prior to Section 135, 
a separating equilibrium existed in which “good” firms engaged in 4% CSR (and thereby 
signaled their type), while “bad” firms did no CSR activity.63 After Section 135, “good” firms 
must increase their CSR – e.g. to 8% – to remain distinguishable from the “bad” firms (which 
now spend 2%). This may not be worth the cost, in which case the “good” firms will settle for a 
pooling equilibrium in which all firms spend 2%. 
In addition to the signaling story, it is possible that the 2% level serves as a focal point 
because it is specified (though not required) in the law. This would also be consistent with the 
observed pattern (among large firms) of convergence from both below and above to 2%. This 
result also connects to a broader literature that examines what happens when a practice that was 
previously voluntary becomes mandated. In some scenarios, this may have a deleterious effect 
on the underlying practice, with the threshold becoming both a ceiling and a floor (or an 
“anchor”).64 Finally, to the extent that CSR activity reflects intrinsic motivations of firms’ 
insiders, the result may also be seen as relating to the literature on the crowd-out of intrinsic 
motivation (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). 
5.4) CSR Mandates versus Corporate Taxation 
Finally, one of the most intriguing aspects of Section 135 is that it can be viewed as a tax 
imposed by the government (of 2% of net profits), albeit spent by the firms (rather than by the 
government) on a broad array of CSR activities.65 This prompts two different types of questions. 
One of these concerns the parallels between our empirical findings and results on the impact of 
corporate taxes on firm value. The other is about when such a rule might be preferable to a 
                                                 
63 Lys, Naughton and Wang (2015) present evidence that CSR activity may signal future financial performance.  
64 For example, in 1993 the US Congress enacted Section 162(m) of the US tax code. This provision limited the 
deductibility to corporations of an executive’s compensation to $1 million (unless the compensation is performance-
based). Subsequently, some firms that had been paying their CEOs less than $1 million of salary increased their 
salaries to $1 million (Harris and Livingstone, 2002). 
65 Note, however, that while loss-making firms are exempt from the CSR requirement, firms are not able to “carry 
forward” losses to offset their future CSR obligations. In this respect, the CSR “tax” is less favorable to firms than 
the typical corporate tax. Moreover, as described in Section 3, firms are required to spend 2% of an income measure 
that is averaged over the last 3 years, so it appears possible that a loss-making firm may face CSR obligations based 
on this 3-year average income measure (whereas it would have no current tax obligations). 
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straightforward tax of 2%; although we do not develop a formal model here, we identify below a 
few key factors to consider.66 
Increases in corporate tax rates would, other things equal, be expected to lead to 
commensurate reductions in the after-tax value of corporations. While there is a substantial 
literature on the valuation effects of various aspects of firms’ responses to taxation (e.g. Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2009), there is relatively little event study evidence on market reactions to 
corporate tax changes. Moreover, these market reactions are potentially difficult to interpret, as 
they depend not simply on the tax rate change, but also on changes in the tax base, firms’ 
responses (e.g. firms may reduce investment and increase their pretax return, thereby shifting 
some of the incidence from capital to labor), and on the personal tax treatment of shareholders’ 
returns. Perhaps the most closely analogous study is on the 1986 US tax reform, which reduced 
corporate tax rates while broadening the corporate base (with the latter effect dominating, such 
that corporate tax revenue increased substantially). Givoly and Hayn (1992) analyze the 
aggregate impact of various legislative events associated with this reform on firms’ market 
values, computing an overall decline in market value of about $450 billion. The present value of 
the additional tax payments, however, are estimated to be about $275 billion. Thus, as in our 
setting, the market reaction was rather more negative than would be expected from the direct 
cash flow consequences. 
That then leads to our second question – when might India’s CSR rule be preferable to a 
straightforward tax? Important differences between Section 135 and a corporate tax include who 
spends the funds and what kind of disclosure accompanies it. In the latter, governments (i.e., 
government employees) spend the money on whatever it considers its priorities, with the level of 
disclosure determined by the political system. Under Section 135, firms (i.e., firm insiders and 
employees) spend the money, with the level of disclosure determined by securities law. The 
Section 135 approach may be advantageous if there are reasons to think that firm employees will 
do a better job than government employees in deciding where to spend the funds, for instance 
because firms stand to gain goodwill from (effective) CSR spending and so motivate employees 
to spend funds effectively. If so, firms’ employees may find better projects and avoid siphoning 
                                                 
66 There has been considerable policy interest in the apparent growth of tax avoidance activity by multinational firms 
(e.g. OECD, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014). Indeed, current discussion seems to entertain the possibility that tax 
payments by large multinationals may be sufficiently voluntary in nature to constitute CSR activity (e.g. Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). In this environment, CSR mandates may possibly be viewed by some policymakers as an 
alternative to corporate taxation. 
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funds off to other activities. It is not clear that government employees have similar incentives, 
and in some emerging market (and other) contexts the risk of government employees’ misuse of 
funds may be greater than that associated with firms’ employees. 
A related point is that firms’ decisions on CSR spending might reveal their private 
information on effective CSR programs. For example, firms might better target their resources to 
providers that generate the “best” results. Firms’ choices might influence other firms (especially 
if firms disclose their CSR spending in detail) so that more funds reach “better” providers. This 
could be valuable if the firms’ decisions track the efficacy of the providers in meeting their stated 
objectives and if firms’ have some advantage in gathering, publicizing and making credible such 
information. 
We hasten to add, however, that these comments should not be taken to suggest that firms 
are always better at this sort of activity than the government. It is not difficult to imagine less 
optimistic scenarios. It is not impossible that politicians may favor a CSR mandate because it 
enables them to pressure firms to direct CSR activity to politicians’ preferred causes or 
organizations. However, it should be remembered that such pressure could have been exerted 
before Section 135, as nothing prevented firms from spending on CSR. Section 135 adds the 
element of mandatory disclosure of CSR activities. This may enable politicians to better monitor 
firms’ choice of CSR beneficiaries, and make it more likely that firms direct their spending 
towards politically favored groups. If this is expected to be widespread, then our estimate of the 
market reaction may be influenced by this expectation and the estimate may not reflect the 
returns from “genuine” CSR activity that is free of political pressure. We plan to explore such 
issues (and the question raised above of whether firms direct CSR spending to the “best” 
providers) through the hand-collection of further information from disclosures of CSR activity. 
More generally, India’s experiment with Section 135 provides an opportunity to think more 
broadly about how one might approach the issue of providing certain kinds of CSR activities and 
the circumstances in which the approach in India might be potentially desirable. We leave more 
fulsome discussion of this to future research. 
 
6) Conclusion  
 The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities of firms are of great interest to 
policymakers, practitioners, investors, and the general public. They have generated a vast 
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academic literature cutting across multiple disciplines, and implicating fundamental questions 
regarding corporate governance, the role of corporations in society, and the institutional design 
of the provision of public goods. This paper analyzes the consequences of CSR activity using the 
quasi-experimental variation created by Section 135 of India’s Companies Act of 2013, which 
requires (on a “comply-or-explain” basis) that firms satisfying specific size or profit thresholds 
spend a minimum of 2% of their net profit on CSR.  
 Using an RD design based on a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach, we 
find a negative and substantial effect on firm value around the first announcement of the CSR 
mandate. This effect is larger than the 2% spending requirement, suggesting the importance of 
additional compliance and disclosure costs, and implying that the private returns of mandated 
CSR activity to firms around the threshold are small. The effect seems to be concentrated among 
firms that are less customer-facing, as indicated by low advertising expenditures; along with 
other evidence we report, this indicates some degree of substitutability between CSR and 
advertising. We also find significant increases in CSR activity among firms subject to the new 
provision, especially along the extensive margin (i.e. the fraction of firms engaging in CSR 
spending). For a subset of large firms (the top 100), we find that while firms initially spending 
less than 2% increased their CSR activity, firms initially spending more than 2% reduced their 
CSR expenditures after Section 135 came into effect. These findings bring new evidence to bear 
on the wide-ranging debates over the consequences of CSR activities, and suggest new ways of 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around August 6, 2010 in the 





Note: These graphs plot cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the August 6, 2010 event 
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million in fiscal year 2010. The vertical red line represents the Section 135 net profit threshold of 
INR 50 million. The figure also shows fitted values on either side of the threshold, using local 
polynomial regressions with polynomials of degree one (top panel), degree two (middle panel), 




Figure 2: Placebo Test – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around August 6, 2010 in 
the Neighborhood of Net Profits of INR 100 million 
 
 
Note: This graph plots cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the August 6, 2010 event 
(using a +/- 3 day window) for firms with net profit in the range of INR 90 million to INR 110 
million in fiscal year 2010. The vertical red line represents net profits of INR 100 million (the 
placebo threshold). The figure also shows fitted values on either side of the threshold, using local 
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Figure 3: Test for Manipulation of Net Profits in the Neighborhood (INR 40 million to INR 
60 million) of the Threshold (INR 50 million) in Fiscal Year 2015 
 
 
Note: This density plot represents the density of firms across the range of net profits INR 40 
million to INR 60 million in fiscal year 2015. The test is that developed by Cattaneo, Jansson 
and Ma (2017), based on McCrary’s (2008) test for manipulation of the running variable in a 
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Figure 4: Difference-in-Difference Analysis – Mean CSR Spending by Treatment and 
Control Firms (for Firm-Years with Net Profit below INR 100 million) 
 
Note: This graph plots the mean level of CSR spending among treatment firms (those satisfying the Section 135 size 
criteria) and control firms (those not satisfying these criteria) for the years 2012-2015. The sample is restricted to 
firm-years with net profit below INR 100 million. Missing values of CSR spending are treated as zeroes. CSR 
expenditures are constructed as described in the text, and are Winsorized from above at 5%. 
 
Figure 5: Difference-in-Difference Analysis – Fractions of Treatment and Control Firms 
Reporting Strictly Positive CSR Spending 
 
Note: This graph plots the fraction of firms reporting strictly positive CSR spending, separately for treatment firms 
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Figure 6: The Ratio of Sales to Total Assets in 2015 among Firms in the Neighborhood of 
the Net Profit Threshold (INR 40 million to INR 60 million) 
 
 
Note: This graph plots the ratio of sales to total assets in fiscal year 2015 for firms with net profit 
in the range of INR 40 million to INR 60 million. Observations where the sales to assets ratio 
exceeds 6 are omitted. The vertical red line represents the Section 135 net profit threshold of 
INR 50 million. The figure also shows fitted values on either side of the threshold, using local 
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Figure 7: Return on Assets (ROA) in 2015 among Firms in the Neighborhood of the Net 
Profit Threshold (INR 40 million to INR 60 million) 
 
 
Note: This graph plots the return on assets (ROA) in fiscal year 2015 for firms with net profit in 
the range of INR 40 million to INR 60 million. Observations where ROA exceeds 0.25 are 
omitted. The vertical red line represents the Section 135 net profit threshold of INR 50 million. 
The figure also shows fitted values on either side of the threshold, using local polynomial 
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Figure 8: Mean CSR Spending by Large Firms before and after Section 135 
 
 
Note: This bar chart reports mean CSR expenditures as a percentage of net profits in fiscal years 
2014 and 2015 by 55 of the largest 100 Indian firms (i.e. all firms in this category for which the 








Note: These histograms represent the frequency distribution over CSR expenditures as a 
percentage of net profits (measured in percentage points) in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for 55 of 
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December 14-21, 2009 The first proposals are made for a voluntary CSR 
provision as part of the new Companies Act. 
 
No 
August 6, 2010 First announcement of a mandatory CSR requirement 
(using the specific size thresholds) 
 
Yes 
September 8, 2010 
 
Parliamentary standing committee recommends 
mandatory CSR requirement 
 
Yes 
December 24, 2010 Media reports of a relaxation from mandatory CSR to 
a comply-or-explain obligation 
 
Yes 
February 10, 2011, 
March 14, 2011 
 
Further news of movement towards a comply-or-
explain obligation 
Yes 
July 11, 2011 The first proposals are made for a mandatory CSR 
provision as part of the new Companies Act. 
 
Yes 
August 13, 2012 SEBI (India’s securities regulator) requires disclosure 
of CSR spending by the largest 100 firms. 
 
No 
December 18, 2012 The bill that became the Companies Act of 2013 is 
passed by the Lok Sabha (the lower house of 
Parliament). The bill includes the CSR provision. 
 
Yes 
August 8, 2013 The bill that became the Companies Act of 2013 is 
passed by the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of 
Parliament). The bill includes the CSR provision. 
 
Yes 
August 29, 2013 President assents to the Companies Act. 
 
No 
September 20, 2013 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs issues rules on 
what counts as CSR for purposes of the Act. 
 
No 
February 27, 2014 These rules are approved 
 
No 
April 1, 2014 The CSR requirement of Section 135 becomes 
effective for firms satisfying the size-related 
thresholds (from the 2014-15 fiscal year 
 
No 
Note: This list of event dates is based searches for media reports and on parliamentary records. 
See CSR Voluntary Guidelines (2009); MONEYCONTROL, CNBC-TV18 News, August 6, 2010, 
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op cit; INDIACORPLAWBLOG, August 7, 2010, op cit; Standing Committee on Finance, Twenty-
First Report (The Companies Bill, 2009); BUSINESS STANDARD, September 8, 2010, op cit; 
TIMES OF INDIA, December 24, 2010, op cit; TIMES OF INDIA, February 10, 2011, op cit; JUST 
MEANS, March 14, 2011, op cit; The Companies Bill (Proposed), 2011, No. 121, Lok Sabha, 
Clause 135; SEBI Circular CIR/CFD/DIL/8/2012, August 13, 2012.  
 
 
Table 2: The Impact on Firm Value of the Major Events in the Enactment of Section 135 – 
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Media reports of a relaxation from 
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The bill that became the Companies Act 
of 2013 is passed by the Lok Sabha (the 
lower house of Parliament). The bill 








The bill that became the Companies Act 
of 2013 is passed by the Rajya Sabha 
(the upper house of Parliament). The 






Note: This table reports regression discontinuity (RD) estimates for cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) calculated using a (-3, +3) window around each of the major event dates, as described in 
the text. The CARs are Winsorized at 5%. The RD estimates use the INR 50 million threshold 
50




for net profits specified in Section 135, and the samples include only those firms that did not 
meet either of the net worth or sales thresholds (and for whom the net profit threshold is 
therefore binding). Net profit, net worth and sales are determined as of the closest financial year 
to the event date. The RD estimates are based on a nonparametric local polynomial regression 
approach, and implemented using the “rdrobust” package developed by Calonico et al. (2014b), 
with a triangular kernel, bandwidth selected to optimize mean squared error, and a third-order 
polynomial. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3: Placebo Tests for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around August 6, 2010 – 
RD Estimates using Local Polynomial Regressions 
 
 (1) 









RD Estimate -0.00783 0.00376     
 (0.02093) (0.01998) 
   
Number of Observations 2252 2252 
   
Note: This table reports regression discontinuity (RD) estimates for cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) calculated using a (-3, +3) window around the August 6, 2010 event. The RD estimates 
are calculated for each of two placebo thresholds (net profit of INR 100 million and net profit of 
INR 150 million). They are based on a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach, and 
implemented using the “rdrobust” package developed by Calonico et al. (2014b), with a 
triangular kernel, bandwidth selected to optimize mean squared error, and a third-order 
polynomial. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around August 6, 
2010 and for Control Variables in Fiscal Year 2010 
 





CAR around August 6, 2010 -0.0066142 0.0934474 3,171 
Indicator for Section 135 0.6478179 0.4777064 4,262 
Total Assets (Fiscal Year 2010) 23759.23 225225.6 4,209 
Advertising Expenditures (Fiscal Year 2010) 90.47138 655.2254 1,932 
Export Earnings (Fiscal Year 2010) 2803.42 26508.03 1,839 
Net Profit (Fiscal Year 2010) 2335.763 18122.34 4,169 
Sales (Fiscal Year 2010) 8721.394 73381.95 3,446 
Net Worth (Fiscal Year 2010) 5210.476 36394.27 4,212 
Note: The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the August 6, 2010 event are calculated 
using a (-3, +3) window, as described in the text, and are Winsorized at 5%. All financial 
variables are in millions of INR, and are obtained from the Prowess database. 
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Firms with net 




Firms with net 
profit in the 
range INR 0-


















net profit in 







Dependent Variable: CAR around August 6, 2010 
 
     
Indicator = 1 if Section -0.02633* -0.02720* -0.03552* -0.01203 
135 applies (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) 
     
Total Assets 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising Expenditures 0.00039*** 0.00042***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
Export Earnings -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00000 -0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quadratic Functions of     
Profits, Sales, and Net Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worth?     
     
Constant -0.00466 -0.00425 -0.00998 0.00700 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
Observations 1,036 981 544 492 
R-squared 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.019 
     
Note: The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the August 6, 2010 event are calculated 
using a (-3, +3) window, as described in the text, and are Winsorized at 5%. All financial 
variables are in millions of INR. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 











Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for CSR Expenditures and Control Variables for Fiscal 
Years 2012-2015 
 







15.16738 33.53105 2,284 
CSR Expenditures (treating missing 
observations as zeroes) 
1.875395 12.80217 18,472 
Indicator for Section 135 
 
0.6639238 .4723781 18,472 
Total Assets (Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
 
39913.62 382694.7 16,361 
Advertising Expenditures (Fiscal Years 
2012-2015) 
112.6742 887.8421 8,480 
Export Earnings (Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
 
5017.355 57803.53 7,251 
Net Profit (Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
 
3754.378 30427.55 16,362 
Sales (Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
 
13442.6 124582.6 13,770 
Net Worth (Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
 
7921.936 54824.68 16,372 
Ratio of Sales to Total Assets (Fiscal Years 
2012-2015) 
0.8752026 1.269247 13,767 
Return on Assets (ROA; Fiscal Years 2012-
2015) 
0.1100781 1.95438 16,341 
Indicator for CSR > 0 (Fiscal Years 2012-
2015) 
0.0867259 0.2814405 18,472 
Indicator for Advertising Expenditures > 0 
(Fiscal Years 2012-2015) 
0.4202577 0.4936136 18,472 
    
Note: CSR expenditures are constructed as described in the text, and are Winsorized from above 
at 5%. All financial variables are in millions of INR. The indicator for Section 135 is set to 1 for 
firm-years in which the net profit, sales, or net worth criteria for Section 135 are satisfied 
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Indicator = 1 if Section 5.96820*** 5.72615*** 9.73799*** 5.12944*** 
135 applies (0.501) (0.490) (1.262) (0.527) 
     
Total Assets  0.00003 -0.00010 -0.00002 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising Expenditures  0.01050*** 0.03130*** -0.00233 
  (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) 
Export Earnings  -0.00005 0.00007 -0.00003 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quadratic Functions of     
Profits, Sales, and Net Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worth?     
     
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Period 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 
Observations 13,770 13,770 2,108 13,068 
Number of Firms 3,988 3,988 915 3,807 
R-squared (within) 0.143 0.163 0.222 0.044 
     
Note: CSR expenditures are constructed as described in the text, and are Winsorized from above 
at 5%. All financial variables are in millions of INR. Missing observations for advertising 
expenditures and export earnings are treated as zeroes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 








Table 8: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Section 135 on the 






with net profit 








profit in the 
range INR 0-
100 million  
 
 Dependent Variable: Indicator 
for CSR Expenditures > 0 
Dependent Variable: 
Indicator for Advertising 
Expenditures > 0 
     
Indicator = 1 if Section 0.32815*** 0.04693** -0.02118** -0.02647 
135 applies (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) 
     
Total Assets 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising Expenditures 0.00008** -0.00336   
 (0.000) (0.002)   
Export Earnings -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00000 0.00009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quadratic Functions of     
Profits, Sales, and Net Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worth?     
     
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Period 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 2012-2015 
Observations 13,770 5,659 13,770 5,659 
Number of Firms 3,988 2,196 3,988 2,196 
R-squared (within) 0.274 0.020 0.002 0.011 
     
Note: All financial variables are in millions of INR. Missing observations for advertising 
expenditures and export earnings are treated as zeroes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
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Outcome Variable: Annual 
CSR Expenditure (in INR 





Outcome Variable: Annual 
CSR Expenditure (in INR 
Millions) in 2012-2014 
 
RD Estimate 2.7288* 0.59024 
 (1.4983) (2.3352) 
   
Observations 465 789 
   
Notes: The RD estimates are based on a nonparametric local polynomial regression approach, 
and implemented using the “rdrobust” package developed by Calonico et al. (2014b), with a 
triangular kernel, bandwidth selected to optimize mean squared error, and a third-order 
polynomial. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 




CSR Expenditures by Firms Spending  
< 2% in 2014 (INR Millions) 
 
CSR Expenditures by Firms Spending  
≥ 2% in 2014 (INR Millions) 











394.1862 45 1644.481 2278.836 10 
2015 501.8097 
 
587.7019 45 1302.998 2279.675 10 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for CSR expenditures (measured in INR Millions) 
by 55 of the largest 100 Indian firms (i.e. all firms in this category for which the required data 



























Firms in the 
top 100 with 
CSR 
expenditure < 
2% of profits 
in 2014 
(3) 
Firms in the 
top 100 with 
CSR 
expenditure ≥ 
2% of profits 
in 2014 
(4) 
Firms in the 
top 100 with 
CSR 
expenditure < 
2% of profits 
in 2014 
 
 Dependent Variable: Change in CSR Expenditure (as a % of 
Profits) from 2014 to 2015 
     
Indicator = 1 if CSR 1.12601***    
expenditure < 2% of  (0.239)    
profits in 2014     
     
Change in Profits from  -0.00023 0.01357  
2014 to 2015 (INR Billions)  (0.004) (0.029)  
     
Indicator = 1 if CSR    0.43147** 
expenditure < 1% of     (0.184) 
profits in 2014     
     
Constant -0.46760** 0.64496*** -0.37932* 0.39952*** 
 (0.217) (0.104) (0.193) (0.120) 
     
Observations 55 44 8 45 
R-squared 0.298 0.0001 0.049 0.101 
     
Note: The dependent variable is the change in CSR Expenditure as a percentage of net profits 
from 2014 to 2015. It is measured in percentage points. Robust standard errors are in 
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